Opinion | Yunus’s China Visit Doesn’t Exactly Overflow With Goodies

Yunus has faced negative press in India from the outset, as Bangladesh plunged into a spiral of violence against minorities and Awami League leaders—developments he appeared unable to control. Social media added fuel to the fire, as did muddled reports on border clashes, which were more the result of villagers aiding smugglers than of any real skirmishes.

While student leaders like Nahid Islam have been openly hostile towards India, Yunus began his tenure by calling for ‘good relations’ with Delhi. However, matters worsened following the arrest of Chinmoy Krishna Das last year, and the situation has since deteriorated rapidly.

Apparently, Bangladesh did want Yunus to visit India first but was unable to secure a suitable date. That may well be true, but his visit to China—while understandable in terms of the assistance hoped for—saw Yunus making some remarkable statements that appeared to be a deliberate snub to India.

NOTHING (YET) IN THE BAG FROM BEIJING

The visit to Beijing would have been planned months in advance and was preceded by a trip from Foreign Minister Touhid Hossain, who met his counterpart with hopes of securing budgetary support and an extended loan repayment period, in addition to pushing for greater regional connectivity.

In the days that followed, Hossain was heard saying that no agreements were expected to be signed—only several Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs). That hardly boded well for the visit. The Chinese Foreign Ministry’s statement was characteristically bland, as is its practice. However, the Dhaka Tribune reported a combined investment figure of $1.2 billion. The Chinese Ambassador in Dhaka—who could reasonably be described as a ‘wolf warrior’—declared that 30 Chinese companies had pledged $1 billion. Of this, $400 million was reportedly ‘planned’ for the Mongla Port modernisation project, $350 million for the development of a China Industrial Zone, and $150 million as technical assistance. The “rest", which remains entirely unclear, is said to be in the form of grants.

As of now, it does not appear that China has made any commitments regarding the extension of loan repayment periods or the reduction of interest rates from a reported 3 per cent to about one per cent. It may be recalled that former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina had also requested a $5 billion soft loan and was rebuffed—despite having cleared several Chinese projects, including a naval base and the first joint military exercise.

THE BOAO FORUM

The statement at the Boao Forum joint press release—again a Bangladeshi document—speaks of future prospects such as a Free Trade Agreement and the “signing of the Implementation Plan of the MoU on Exchange of Hydrological Information of the ‘Yarlung Zangbo-Jamuna River’" (the Brahmaputra). Bangladesh also ‘welcomed’ Chinese participation in the Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project and mentioned a 50-year ‘master plan’ for river management. Yet, nothing has been concretely committed to.

Not content with a project that is extremely sensitive for India—given its implications for the 24-km-wide Siliguri Corridor that connects the northeast with the rest of the country—Yunus, at a round table discussion, went further. He asked China to leverage its strategic position as a ‘guardian of the oceans’, linking it to the status of ‘landlocked’ northeastern states and framing this as an opportunity for an “extension of the Chinese economy".

This appears to have been a more informal discussion, and it is possible that Yunus was speaking beyond the ‘text’ provided by his ministry. Nonetheless, it raised a ripple of apprehension across India. Ministers from the Northeast, across party lines, have predictably reacted with anger, with one even calling for the breakup of Bangladesh. While such remarks are often for public consumption, there is no doubt that Yunus has succeeded in setting the cat among the pigeons.

Meanwhile, the only concrete agreement to emerge is the approval for Bangladesh to export fresh fruits to help address the significant trade imbalance. There is also a reported decision to grant the country ‘quota-free and duty-free’ access until 2028—well beyond the point at which Bangladesh is expected to graduate from its status as a “Least Developed Economy". This represents a boost for Bangladeshi exports.

According to OEC data, China exported goods worth $22.9 billion to Bangladesh, while Bangladesh’s exports stood at a mere $6,777. An often-overlooked aspect is the strengthening of the health sector—a long-standing pillar of India-Bangladesh relations, with approximately 5,000–7,000 medical travellers daily. China had earlier designated three top-tier hospitals in Yunnan for this purpose, and the sector is likely to see growth. It is also noteworthy that the first foreign naval fleet to arrive in Bangladesh was a Chinese flotilla.

In the final analysis, what is apparent is abundant Chinese caution, with not even an official joint statement, with a leader who is officially not the head of government. That said, none of this diminishes the significant Chinese footprint in the country. According to the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), total Chinese investment is estimated at around $7.07 billion, while Chinese companies have secured construction contracts worth $22.94 billion.

Although additional investment is likely to be held back until after the elections and a settling of the still-volatile social situation, China is expected to eventually accept Bangladesh’s offer to ‘offshore’ industries—taking advantage of cheap labour and the country’s rapidly developing ports.

Given the outreach to China even by Islamic groups such as the Jamaat—with no evident concern about Beijing’s treatment of the Uyghurs—China faces no political hurdles in dealing with any future government, however radical it may be.

What is particularly striking is that, despite continued—though somewhat reduced—rhetoric against India, there has been no media focus on the fact that China, in effect, gave away nothing at all.

Meanwhile, US State Department officials arrived in Bangladesh, emphasising that transparency, the rule of law, and democracy are vital for American investment in the country. The US is the top source of FDI in Bangladesh and remains Dhaka’s largest export destination. What it says matters.

But even if democracy is slow in coming, US influence is not likely to diminish.

India, meanwhile, has adopted a pragmatic policy. Prime Minister Modi extended warm wishes to the country on Eid, and prominent visitors—such as Foreign Secretary Misri—have gone out of their way to make positive statements.

And don’t forget: despite the political noise, normal trade continues, and visa issuance is likely to increase soon.

The trick is to control the narrative—something that’s spiralling out of control on social media on both sides. One can also expect aspiring and established political parties in Dhaka to continue India-baiting, simply because it ‘sells’, at least until the elections come around.

The thrust of India’s policy should be to reduce the value of that currency through quiet diplomacy and a low profile—for now. Dhaka knows perfectly well that Delhi has no designs on its territory or its sovereignty, even as it supports Bangladesh in areas of critical interest to both countries.

That’s not weakness. It’s called national interest.

The writer is a Distinguished Fellow at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi. She tweets @kartha_tara. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect News18’s views.